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The UK Fire and Rescue Service is subject to reform, along with other public sector services, resulting 
in later retirement age  and budget limitations; the fire service is also subject to other societal 
changes such as shifts in fitness levels and a reduction in call outs.  This chapter reviews these 
changes and considers them from an operations management perspective. A method for how to 
measure operational effectiveness is proposed and its use in informing changes to operating practice 
in the fire service is advocated. 
Introduction 
Reform in the Fire and rescue service in the UK is driven by multiple agendas including seeking 
continuous improvement, meeting cost reductions and a political desire to reform these established 
public services (Public Accounts Committee 2011). Examples of these changes to working practices 
for the emergency services are documented for ambulance (Public Accounts Committee 2011), 
police (Windsor 2012) and fire services (Connor 2013).  In addition to change driven by government, 
public services also need to respond to demographic and societal change. The average age of 
firefighters is likely to increase with the proposed implementation of later retirement and this could 
have implications for the typical levels of health, fitness and experience among firefighters. In 
addition, changes in geographic population density, road use and home safety affects both the 
nature and quantity of demand for fire and rescue services.  This chapter explores how some of 
these changes are affecting the fire services. It includes reference to two cases where change is 
taking place and explores the role that operational effectiveness measurement can have in 
understanding and managing change.  
Literature 
The government direction for Fire and Rescue Services in England is set in the “Fire and rescue 
national framework for England” Department for Communities and Local Government (2012) and 
follows an equivalent document for 2008-2011. It states it “..sets out high level expectations.  It does 
not prescribe operational matters.  These are best determined locally by fire and rescue authorities..”.  
The priorities are: 
 
“1. identify and assess the full range of foreseeable fire and rescue related risks their areas 
face, make provision for prevention and protection activities and respond to incidents 
appropriately  
2. work in partnership with their communities and a wide range of partners locally and 
nationally to deliver their service  
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3. be accountable to communities for the service they provide”  
(Department for Communities and Local Government (2012) p7) 
Fire and Rescue Services are required to perform a wide range of services at an organisational level.  
These include risk registers, large scale incidence response planning and co-operating with other 
agencies.  This chapter reviews the main changes and contemporary pressures on the UK fire service 
specifically changes to demand and capacity for fire and rescue services, and changes to the profile 
of firefighters and related HR policies with the fire service.  Also reviewed are the operational data 
gathering activities for fire services.   
Fire services are split up in to five family groups within England by the department for Communities 
and Local Government (CLG) for performance monitoring and are categorised as ‘most similar 
services’ (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009). As an example family group 1 
is categorised as rural and family group 5 as metropolitan.  
Changes to demand and capacity for the fire service 
Over the last few decides the role of the fire service has changed. The demand from callouts has 
reduced and in terms of outcomes there has been a considerable reduction in deaths due to fires 
with over a 60% reduction in deaths from domestic fires from the 1980’s until present day with 168 
in 2012/13 (Knight 2013 and fire statistic monitor 2012/2013). For 2012-13 Fire Services nationally 
attended 519,900 incidents of all kinds including fires, road traffic collisions (RTC) and false alarms, 
which has been a 14% reduction on the previous year and a 46% reduction from 2002-3 (Fire 
Statistic Monitor 2012/2013). The Counties, from the second case study, attended broadly 14,000 
emergency calls in 2012-13 which showed a reduction in calls overall on the previous year. However 
there was an increase in RTC attendance and an increase in the number of special service incidents, 
which include such things as animal rescue and chemical spills, highlighting how the nature of the 
role of a firefighter is changing. This reduction in demand is due to a range of prevention activities by 
the fire service, societal change and various improvements in household safety.   
Increasing community engagement activities to reduce the risk of fire appear to have had an effect 
as indicated by the reducing number of deaths in domestic fires.  These types of activities include 
home safety visits, visits to schools and other community events and inspection of high risk premises. 
The time spent on fire safety activities in England (excluding London) changed from just over 
500,000 hours (2002/03) to a peak in 2006/07 of 1,000,000 hours and then reducing to 700,000 
hours in 2012/13. (Fire and Rescue Operational Statistics Bulletin for England: 012-13). Thus the fire 
service has been fulfilling a societal desire to be more effective and in terms of ‘stakeholder value’ 
through the reduction of the causes of fire rather than literally just fire-fighting. 
Other changes to the fire and rescue services activities include attending fewer road traffic accidents 
and other emergencies such as flooding.  There were 156,000 of these non-fire incidents in 2008/09 
and 134,700 in 2012/13 (Fire Statistics Monitor England: April 2009 to March 2010 and April 2012 to 
March 2013). The fire service’s prevention role in reducing road traffic accidents takes place in the 
form of many community and schools activities. Examples can be found on the Chief Fire Officers’ 
Association web page (CFOA 2014) which identifies activities undertaken for Road Safety Week (9 to 
15 June 2014) by 28 Fire and Rescue services across the UK. 
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In conventional operations management this reduction in demand both for emergency fire and non-
fire services would indicate that there was a case for lowering capacity.  However, for each individual 
emergency there is a need to maintain and improve responsiveness. From the property holders’ and 
firefighters’ point of view the capacity to attend a fire quickly is critical. Therefore, response times 
need to be maintained and a geographic coverage of all areas still has to be upheld. This 
combination of a lower number of incidents to be dealt with and demands to maintain national 
coverage and response times represents a challenge to fire services.  
In this context one way of expressing capacity is the number of firefighters. In 2002/3 there were 
31,699 wholetime (full time) firefighters and this has reduced by approximately 11% to 28,166 for 
2010/11 (Knight 2013).  Over the same period the number of retained firefighters (FTE) has grown by 
approximately 9% from 10720 to 11702. This may indicate that while overall numbers are similar, 
the working arrangements of staff are indicative of a drive to develop capacity in a way that reflects 
changes in demands.   
The majority of whole-time firefighters are currently working the shift system laid out in ‘The Grey 
Book’ (Fire Brigades Union, 2009) which outlines the conditions of service for firefighters.  Although 
how this is managed can be agreed locally with each authority, in the most part this consists of 2 day 
shifts, 2 night shifts and 4 days off (224), requiring 4 watches (or crews), to allow for full cover of the 
station.  Alternate working systems are starting to appear within the UK FRS as a way of reducing 
costs by reducing the number of wholetime personnel required to offer the same level of cover, such 
as day crewing plus and day crewed/retained. 
Fitness, age and wellbeing 
Firefighters joining the service prior to 2006 are currently able to retire at age 50 and after 30 years 
of service.  For those joining post 2006 the retirement age increased to age 60 and at the time of 
writing proposals are in place to change the pension rights and retirement age to 60 for all 
operational staff (Department of Communities and Local Government, (2012B), Firefighters’ Pension 
Scheme (England) Order 2006 and  Williams, Wilkinson, Richmond and Rayson (2012)).  The number 
of wholetime firefighters has been reducing in recent years and recruitment has been low 
(Department of Communities and Local Government, 2013). These two factors have combined to 
make the average age of a firefighter increase over time (Bath Chronicle 2014) as firefighters are 
retiring later and fewer, younger firefighters are recruited.  It is well known that fitness reduces as 
we age (Health Survey for England, 2009, Allied Dunbar National Fitness Survey, 1992) and so an 
increasing mean age of firefighters would be likely to adversely affect overall fitness of the service. 
Fitness particularly affects firefighters as a role because of the physical requirements of the job.   
Fitness and health have moved up the fire service agenda in recent years with a key document from 
the Firefit Steering group released in 2009 outlining best practice and key recommendations for 
fitness policy for the UK Fire and Rescue service (Firefit Steering Group, 2009).  This suggests a 
minimum recommended aerobic fitness requirement for operational firefighters based on a review 
of the scientific literature on the physical demands of firefighting.  Recent work has attempted to 
quantify the physical demands of various firefighting tasks within a UK cohort in order to rationalize 
any fitness requirement for the role (Siddall, Standage, Stokes and Bilzon, 2014). Findings of this 
work suggest that tasks related to firefighting can require an oxygen consumption of up to 47ml.kg-
1.min-1 and up to 92% of heart rate reserve, with running out hose and climbing stairs with 
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firefighting equipment being the most demanding activities. This is equivalent to level 10.2 on the 
multi-stage shuttle run test (bleep test). Alongside this, it has been shown that risk profiles of 
firefighters for lifestyle diseases such as coronary heart disease, stroke, obesity and diabetes are in 
line with the general population (Munir, Clemes, Houdmont, and Randall, 2012, Smith, Fehling, 
Frisch, Haller, Winke, Dailey, 2012, Plat, Frings-dresen, and Sluiter, 2012, Poston, Haddock, Jankhe, 
Jitnarin, Tuley and Kales, 2011). Therefore, as the average age of firefighters increases there is a risk 
that age-associated health problems will have a growing negative impact on firefighters’ operational 
effectiveness.  As a consequence, health promotion and wellbeing policies are becoming more 
common in many fire and rescue services.  The majority of research on health and wellbeing within a 
firefighter population has been conducted outside of the UK, mainly in the US, but at the time of 
writing a major national study is being undertaken to assess lifestyle factors in UK firefighters 
(Turner, 2013).  Preliminary results suggest similar findings to the previously mentioned studies 
showing trends in line with the general population for cardiovascular disease risk (Siddall, Standage, 
Stokes and Bilzon, 2014).  The evidence of similar risk profile for firefighters is surprising considering 
the physical nature of the role and the requirement for applicants to achieve a high standard of 
fitness and health.   
There is little data that directly relates firefighter fitness to its effect on operations, but one might 
expect fitter fighters to be more effective.  However, little hard evidence exists to confirm this and to 
assess the relative sensitivity of firefighters’ fitness to operational effectiveness.  This was one of the 
purposes of the study conducted in the ‘Shires’ case study explored later in the chapter.  
   
Operational Data for Fire and Rescue Services. 
Fire and Rescue Services publish annual reports on their performance (see individual fire service 
websites such Derbyshire Fire and Rescue 2012/13 and Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue 
2012/13) and these typically cover areas such as; number of primary fires, average response time – 
first appliance, home fire safety visits, commercial fire safety inspections and energy consumption by 
region.  Much of this data is collected from response data that is collected by incident and details 
information such as incident types and time to attendance. There is some variation in how fire 
services define measures, for example for response times Essex measure the appliance leaving the 
station in under 2 min from the call coming through (this is also called turn out times by some 
services) whereas Leicestershire measure the appliance arriving at an incident in under 10 minutes 
and London is 12 minutes. 
The reports published by different services do not follow a standard format, for example London Fire 
Brigade (2013) base data around their 6 key aims; prevention, protection, response, resources, 
people and principles, and covers key indicators such as those mentioned above. Essex Fire and 
Rescue Service’s (2012) report tends to cover similar types of data but is less organised around aims 
and objectives.  In these reports some fire services often compare their performance with 
performance for their ‘family group’. Data in these reports are used by the Department of 
Communities and Local Government to compare performance of similar fire services within the 
family groups in key areas such as primary fires, road traffic incidents and fire safety. However, there 
appears to be limited measures that cover shorter term operational effectiveness that is likely to be 
important for highlighting changes to operating procedures. These reports are ‘outward facing’, 
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written for public consumption, so it is likely that fire services are self-censoring and are less critical 
than they would be with internal data. 
Two Fire and Rescue Service Cases 
The following two cases explore the use of operational data for two different fire services. The initial 
purpose of conducting the investigations into each of these fire services was not to examine the use 
of operational data but to use it as a yard stick for examining wider changes that affected 
operational practices in the service.  As such the investigation into the use of operational data in 
these cases was not the primary function of the research, however, as part of the research in each 
case the use of operational data emerged as common theme, and hence its presentation here. To 
provide each case with a wider context the initial purpose of the case research is presented. This 
additionally demonstrates the importance of effective operational measures in monitoring change in 
public services, particularly in an environment where maintaining the service levels to the public is 
an overriding requirement.   
The Shire’s Fire and Rescue Service – age and operational effectiveness 
The Shire’s Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) has a mix of rural and some larger non-metropolitan cities 
in its area and they were keen to put an emphasis on maintaining and improving fitness.  They were 
also aware that the mean age of their firefighters was increasing and, conscious of the relationship 
between age and fitness, were interested in monitoring health and fitness levels (Munir, Clemes et al. 
2012). The Shire’s mean age between 2008 and 2011 had increased from 38.5 to 40 years (data from 
Shire’s HR records).  A review of the Shire’s health and fitness data revealed an increase in obesity in 
their firefighters with the number of firefighters in the obese category having risen from 10.9% to 
12.9% between 2008 and 2011.  A change to on-station activities in 2005 had also removed allotted 
time to fitness training. “In 2005 time allocated within the daily work routine for fulltime firefighters 
fitness training was removed, however, two hours a week (tour) is still provided on the night shifts. 
Firefighters, who wish to exercise during the day shifts, complete their training within their allocated 
lunch hour. Part time firefighters have no regular time for exercise allocated. They have a 
requirement to be fit for role, but have to exercise in their own time. PT equipment is provided on 
their stations to facilitate this.” Shire FRS Health & Fitness Adviser.  
The important question for the Shire’s service was: did these changes to age and fitness have an 
effect at an operational level?  To answer this question the Shire FRS wanted to use its existing 
operational data with the firestation as the unit of measurement. This was considered because 
change to working practices was likely to be taking place at the station level. There are also different 
types of fire stations such as full time and part time stations and the performance of these can be 
compared along with differences in fitness facilities and regimes and contrasting demographic 
profiles for firefighters from urban to rural. 
In addition to the specific issues of fitness and demographic changes the Shire also wanted to 
examine their performance measures to enable performance improvement at a local level “giving 
greater emphasis to the operational readiness and competence of stations and watches” Shire FRS 
Area Manager.  
To address these issues the following research questions were posed: 
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1. Using existing operational effectiveness measures is the effectiveness of fire stations 
influenced by fitness levels of their firefighters? 
2. Do the existing and proposed measures of operational effectiveness for fire stations allow 
managers within the Shire FRS to make informed decisions about management of fire 
stations? 
Methodology 
The research used existing data from two principle sources, health and fitness data for individual 
firefighters and existing operational performance data.  Health and fitness data from 785 firefighters 
was sorted by firestation and those with more than thirty firefighters providing valid data were used.  
This resulted in nine firestations being analysed (the smallest had 31 firefighters, the largest had 66). 
Using a series on one way ANOVA analysis, fitness measures were compared between firestations.  
There were several fitness measures available to us; BMI, waist size, VO2 max and % fat.  
Fire stations at each end of the fitness scales i.e. the most fit and least fit, then had their operational 
effectiveness data interrogated to examine if there was any evidence of differences in operational 
performance.  These data were limited to turnout times.   
This analysis served two purposes: firstly to initially explore if different levels of fitness affect 
operational effectiveness (RQ1); and secondly to explore if the existing performance measurement 
system was able to operate at this level of decision making (RQ2). 
Results and conclusions 
Of the nine firestations (FS 1 and FS 2) two showed significant differences in fitness between their 
firefighters for VO2 max and waist size, the rest of the firestations were clustered with similar results, 
with a third firestation (FS 3) that had marginal significance also for VO2 max and waist.  There were 
also differences for % fat and BMI but these were not statistically significant.  The causes of these 
differences are as yet unknown but could be due to different fitness regimes and age. 
In terms of operational performance, the data that was provided related to turnout times and there 
were no significant differences either between FS 1, 2 or 3 or any of the other six firestations.   At 
first this might indicate that differences in fitness make no difference. However turnout times do not 
cover the range of activities performed by firestations thus a more in depth analysis of effectiveness 
is required.  Moreover, the urgency associated with firefighters’ work may buffer the impact of 
fitness on the time taken to attend a fire (i.e. it may be more effortful for those with lower fitness 
levels to achieve a good response time but they are highly motivated to do so because of the 
importance of the task). It may have also been that local geography influenced responsiveness. Thus 
future work includes obtaining better measures for operational effectiveness that includes less 
urgent and / or more discretionary activities at firestation level to allow changes such as health and 
fitness levels to be tracked over time.  
 
Exploration of operational effectiveness at the Shires 
Following the inconclusive results from the fitness and operational effectiveness analysis it was 
decided to further explore how operational effectiveness could be measured using current data 
collected by the Shires and to this end a number of interviews were conducted with: 
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a. A station manager – an operational manager of a station who runs four watches 
b. Two group managers concerned with policy and response 
c. Manager of HR information systems 
d. Manager of HR Business Partners who look at performance issues, capability, discipline 
The interviews were semi structured and reviewed the method for assessing operational 
effectiveness in the fitness study i.e. in the response data and the unit of measure assessment - the 
firestation.  The interviews went on to explore further ways of measuring effectiveness including 
how the current performance measurement system was used and ways to quantify other aspects 
such as preventative activities, for instance public engagement and assessing operational readiness 
and competence of fire crews.  Interviewees were also given an opportunity to suggest any 
additional measures for effectiveness they would want to be included and how this data should be 
handled.   
Results from interviews provided some fairly clear conclusions: 
1. The appropate unit of measurement is the watch not the firestation.  This is because the 
watches are managed by watch managers who have different approaches and the operation 
of different watches at a single station can vary. So calculating effectiveness across watches 
to give an overall station measure will tend to mask variation and give a good measure. 
2. Watches and stations in the Shires adhere to the targets set for response times set fairly 
consistently and so do not show up much variation of effectiveness.  
Suggestions about what could be done to more adequately measure effectiveness were numerous 
and covered a wide range of areas.  Reviewing these suggestions put the researchers in mind of the 
Overall Equipment Effectiveness (OEE) measurement used primarily in lean context to assess the 
effectiveness of individual pieces of equipment. OEE was first proposed by Nakajima (1984) and then 
Rich (1999) and was promoted initially in the automotive sector and then adopted widely through 
endorsement by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, 2000).  It consists of three areas; quality, 
availability and performance with the idea of assessing the important aspects of a particular piece of 
equipment.  This idea can be translated into service application as quality, availability and 
performance are concepts that are highly relevant to service delivery. There is precedence for using 
OEE in non-manufacturing applications, for example Simons, Mason and Gardner (2004) apply it to 
road freight transport. So an initial framework using OEE’s three elements allowed the suggestions 
from the interviews at the Shires to be categorised as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: Summary of suggested operational effectiveness measures structured into OEE categories.  
Conventional 
OEE 
Possible measures Comments 
Performance Turnout times 
Attendance times 
Probably do not vary much 
Too incident specific and dependent on geography? 
Availability  Sickness (neg) 
Stand down times (neg) 
Is availability too narrow a measure for the fire 
service? 
Quality Commendations 
Training competency 
Breathing Apparatus tests 
Vehicle accidents (neg) 
All pretty indirect and either look at preparedness 
or HR issues 
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Critical equipment fails (neg) 
Discipline cases (neg) 
Personal injuries (neg) 
Equipment maintenance  
 
 
 
Maintenance is mainly performed by the 
firefighters and interviewees indicated that this 
measure seems to indicate a well-run station 
 
The comments shown in the final column indicate some shortcomings in measures such as those 
associated with performance and for equipment maintenance the wider implications of this measure. 
The (neg.) notation indicates that as this measure increases it negatively impacts operational 
effectiveness. 
Consideration of these suggestions, the comments and the role of the fire service as stated in Fire 
and Rescue national framework for England (2012) of “identify and assess the full range of 
foreseeable fire and rescue related risks their areas face, make provision for prevention and 
protection activities and respond to incidents appropriately” would indicate that an assessment of 
‘Responsiveness’ , ‘Availability’ and ‘Preparedness’ is appropriate.  Hence the structure of 
performance measures from Table 1 has been altered to Table 2 to better fit this framework, with 
some of the quality related measures appearing in preparedness.   
Table 2: Operational effectiveness measure restructured 
Conventional OEE Possible measures Operational effectiveness for 
Fire and Rescue Service 
Performance 
Turnout times 
Attendance times 
   Responsiveness 
Availability  
Sickness (neg) 
Stand down times (neg) 
   Availability 
Quality 
Equipment maintenance 
Training competency 
Critical equipment fails (neg) 
Breathing Apparatus tests 
Commendations 
Vehicle accidents (neg) 
Discipline cases (neg) 
Personal injuries (neg) 
  Preparedness  
 
So a further conclusion that: 
3. A measure of effectiveness should include some aspect of responsiveness, availability and 
preparedness.    
Conclusions from study 
From the study there is no indication that there are differences in operational effectiveness of 
stations but only if effectiveness is measured in response times at the station level.  Data used for 
effectiveness needs to encompasses a wider range of firefighter activities and that a watch (shift) 
level operational unit of analysis is more likely to be appropriate. To this end the Shire’s fire service 
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decided to develop its own way of assessing effectiveness that involved watch visits by senior 
managers, assessing condition of station, Q&A on Incident Command System policy, incident 
response feedback issues, operational drills, breathing apparatus checks and command point and 
equipment Q&A and this method of assessment is on-going at the Shires. 
To allow future analysis fitness against operational effectiveness a better assessment of 
effectiveness data over considerable time periods and data across a large number of stations will 
need to be gathered.  
The Counties – changing demand for Fire and Rescue Services 
The Counties FRS provides services to a largely rural area with a few medium sized cities and faces 
similar challenges in service delivery to the Shires, they are in the same ‘family group’. Funding from 
central government for fire and rescue services has been cut in recent years and the Counties FRS 
was facing a deficit in their budget of £1m in year 1 and up to £7m in year 3.  Fire and rescue services 
have a statutory requirement to present balanced books and therefore the Counties FRS was faced 
with looking for options to reduce the budget deficit. As part of public sector reform The Counties 
decided to change some fire stations over to Day Crewing Plus (DCP).  DCP is a method of operating 
that still provides full time fire and rescue cover whilst requiring lower levels of manning.  Traditional 
fire service systems are known as a ‘224’ shift system whereby four crews (shifts) rotate over 12 
hours shifts to provide 24 hour cover to a system.  In contrast DCP operates by firefighters ‘living-in’ 
the firestation and working a number of 24 hour shifts, (usually between 1 to 5 days).  During the 24 
hours the firefighters are expected to sleep but are on-call in the case of emergency.   If their rest 
time is interrupted by a call out, the rest time is extended to allow firefighters to catch-up with sleep.  
This change both to working conditions and corresponding home life clearly has potential 
implications – both positive and negative – for firefighter well-being (both physiological and 
psychological).   There are also implications for the fire service and local community as they would 
want to ensure that the effectiveness of the service is maintained with the system of working hours. 
Within this context the Counties fire service commissioned research to investigate the effect of DCP 
on operational performance, and health and wellbeing of the firefighters on DCP with the following 
research questions. 
RQ1: What are the implications of the change in shift pattern for the individuals working the new 
system? 
RQ2: What impact has the change of shift pattern had on the performance of the stations highlighted 
for change, in terms of operational effectiveness? 
 
Methodology 
The method to investigate the health, wellbeing and operational performance of the firefighters was 
a longitudinal mixed methods study with data collection over three stages with the  stations 
intended for DCP; pre-changeover, 6 months post-changeover, and 12 months post-changeover.  
Questionnaires assessing wellbeing, work demands, job satisfaction and job performance were 
triangulated with operational performance data and semi-structured interviews for a full and rich 
account of implementing DCP.  42 participants (out of 56 who are now working on the new system) 
over four fire stations have been interviewed at stage 1 and 22 participants interviewed over two 
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stations at stage 2 with on-going interviews for stage 2 and future for stage 3.  Inductive thematic 
analysis was used to analyse interviews as an iterative process.  The operational performance data 
was derived from existing data that the Counties fire service already collected. Themes and issues 
emerging from either of the three collection methods were then triangulated against the other two 
data collection methods to see if the theme or issue was supported across the three types of data. 
Assessing operational effectiveness has built upon the assessment framework from the Shire’s.  The 
use of operational unit became a moot point for DCP because there are no separate watches just a 
single team on a station who deliver DCP so the unit of analysis is the station.  Thus the following 
aspects shown in Table 3 were assessed.  There are slight differences between the suggestions from 
Table 2 to that assessed in table 3 because the data collection was focused down to a fewer number 
of possible measure that were assessed by the staff (involved in performance measurement at the 
Counties) as the most useful. 
Table 3: Assessment of operational effectiveness for The Counties 
 Possible measures 
Responsiveness Turnout times 
Attendance times 
Availability  Appliance availability 
Sickness (neg) 
Team/Personnel measures Critical equipment failures 
Individual Training  
Equipment maintenance 
Commendations 
Vehicle accidents (neg) 
Discipline cases (neg) 
Personal injuries (neg) 
 
The operational data at the stage of writing was collected from one fire station over a period of 
three months, not all of the data requested in Table 3 was available at fire station level. 
Results and findings 
Thematic analysis of the interviews allowed the richness of firefighters’ expectations and early 
experiences of DCP to be fully explored.  Interview questions focused on the impact of DCP on 
working conditions, work practices and on firefighters’ work-life balance. Those yet to transfer were 
asked about their expectations of DCP while those already on DCP were asked to reflect upon their 
early experiences. They were also asked for their views about the implementation of change 
including the transition from the Watch system. Embedded in these questions were further probe 
questions designed to explore the links between DCP, individual health and well-being and 
operational effectiveness.   
Those working in the DCP system indicated that the longer, unbroken periods of time at the station 
afforded them significant opportunities to shape how they organised and managed several work 
activities that contributed directly to operational effectiveness (for example the completion of their 
‘references’; individually-assigned tasks such as organising community fire safety events). A common 
theme was that work activities could be sequenced and prioritised more flexibly and carried out 
under less time pressure that was often the case in the 224 system with its 12-hour shifts. These job 
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crafting activities were also reflected in the relatively high levels of job control reported in the 
questionnaire measure.  There was also an enhanced sense of co-dependency as the new system 
meant that firefighters did not ‘hand-over’ tasks to a another watch at the end of their shift: many 
reported an increased sense of ownership over tasks and that they felt they had more opportunities 
and motivation to see tasks through to a conclusion within a batch of DCP working hours. Those 
interviewed also reported that working relationships were different within DCP as a result of 
firefighters spending longer unbroken periods of time together and with the changes to the team 
that occurred as firefighters finished their batch of hours and others took their place. Together these 
features of enhanced control, autonomy, influence over decisions and - at times - increased support 
from colleagues had fostered a strong teamworking environment. Several managerial tasks were 
dealt with through effective collaboration between all the firefighters working at the station (e.g. 
managing work hours to ensure that there was sufficient cover at the station over every 24-hour 
period).  Most indicated that overall workload was unchanged but that it felt more varied as 
extended periods within the station environment bought them into contact with a wider range of 
work activities. The majority view was that work time felt less pressurised as not all tasks needed to 
be completed within the 12-hour period attached to the 224 watch system.  
Managers indicated that their role had changed with DCP with them needing to oversee a more 
diverse and larger group of firefighters drawn from several different watches. They indicated that 
this presented them with opportunities to shape the way that DCP was implemented in their station 
to ensure that it worked as well as it could.  For example, they needed to be more aware of how long 
individual staff had been at the station since starting a batch of DCP so that their workload could be 
managed effectively. Managers felt that they had more flexibility over the setting of deadlines for 
work and the prioritisation of tasks as the end of a 12-hour shift no longer dictated the end-point for 
several tasked they allocated to firefighters. They also reported some additional demands associated 
with helping firefighters to adapt to the new ways of working and supporting them through the 
change process. Most reported that these activities could impact on organisational effectiveness, 
usually in a positive way, but that established measures might not be sensitive to the impact of these 
everyday managerial interventions. In some instances, different managers at the same station used 
their increased control to develop ways of working that differed from those implemented by 
another manager at the same station. However, in some stations managers chose to work closely 
together to develop consistent ways of working to ensure that DCP operated in the same way 
regardless of which manager happened to be on duty at any given time. Interestingly, awareness of 
a range of performance measures was generally limited to station managers with most firefighters 
focusing on day-to-day verbal feedback from their manager or colleagues to gain an insight into their 
own, and their crew’s effectiveness. This suggested that published effectiveness data were not 
directly influencing firefighters’ day-to-day work behaviour.  
It was notable that different stations managed the transition to DCP in different ways. In some a very 
collaborative approach was taken with station managers collating and discussing suggestions from 
firefighters prior to the implementation of DCP. In other stations, managers collaborated with each 
other but there was less consultation before implementation with feedback being actively sought on 
new ways of working once they had been trialled. Discussions involving all stations staff that were 
seen to influence the implementation of DCP were viewed very favourably and cited as an important 
factor in successful transition.  
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There were some early indications of individual differences in firefighters’ responses to DCP. Some 
indicated that working for longer un-broken periods of time suited their personal circumstances (as 
it was also accompanied by longer unbroken periods away from work). Others were still taking time 
to adapt to the longer periods of time away from home and the way that it influenced how they 
managed their commitments and relationships outside of work. There were also differences in the 
perceptions of DCP between those firefighters who had chosen to move for personal reasons such as 
pension boosting in the last few years of service, who had broadly positive perceptions, and those 
who felt they had to move in order to stay at a station they felt connected with, who were more 
negative in their perceptions.  
An interesting point was made about the possibility of career stagnation because of DCP for two 
possible reasons; firstly due to the reduction of the number of personnel, fewer crew and watch 
manager posts are needed preventing those who are qualified from obtaining a promotion, and 
secondly, those firefighters who are working DCP are earning more with their enhancement than the 
standard salary for the next rank up reducing the incentive for those firefighters to attempt 
promotion. 
The operational data collected from one fire station over a period of three months indicated that 
preventative measures included in preparedness marginally improved under DCP.   The availability 
data was more complex to interpret because the change to DCP had affected manning for the part-
time appliance and hence its availability. Responsiveness over the short term did indicate that it may 
be useful a measure of effectiveness for transfer to DCP, although analysis of the interviews did 
indicate that there was not a high awareness of this among the firefighters. 
Conclusions from Counties Study 
The triangulation of wellbeing interviews and questionnaires with operational effectiveness data 
provides a valuable insight into changes to work practices in the public sector. In some cases the 
interview material supported operation data, for example around the area of references and 
preparedness data. Interview material about the use of performance measures indicated that they 
were not well used or known at an operational level, and they could be informative in managing the 
change to DCP. 
The findings from the study are on-going and will be used to inform any possible further DCP 
implementation at the Shires 
Conclusions for measuring operation effectiveness in the UK Fire 
services. 
This chapter highlights a tension in the public sector; in order to provide value for public service 
stakeholders prevention activities reduce demand, in this case prevention of fires and lowering the 
need for rescue.   The reduction of demand creates an opportunity for lowering capacity and hence 
costs, but this causes two problems; first in terms of geographical coverage for the individual who 
still needs FRS and secondly a reduction in staffing levels which can be met either by redundancy, 
shorter hours or recruitment freezes.  A principle method of staff reduction used by the fires services 
has been recruitment freezes (Local Government Group, 2011) and this in turn then increases 
average age levels in the Fire Service. Increasing age levels combined with a reduction in general 
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population fitness – a trend the fire service follows – tends to reduce overall fitness in the fire 
service, a service which is physically demanding.  These drivers of change in the fire service lead us 
to propose three propositions: 
Proposition 1: A systematic and robust method of evaluating operational effectiveness would be 
helpful in assessing the current and future changes likely in the fire service.  This would allow fire 
service to conduct the type of reform that is demanded of them, whilst still ensuring an effective 
service is available; a crucial tool in operational decision making.   
Proposition 2: The use of responsiveness, availability and preparedness measures seems to 
encompass appropriate aspects of effectiveness relevant at an operational level for firestations and 
these should be at watch level for 224 firestations. 
Proposition 3: The triangulation of wellbeing interviews and questionnaires with operational 
effectiveness data provides a valuable insight into changes to work practices in the public sector, 
particularly for the type of substantial change to DCP.  The future findings from this research will be 
informative both to the Counties FRS in their own DCP deployment and other fire services 
undergoing similar change. 
Future work includes completing the Counties study of DCP and fully realising the Operational 
Effectiveness measurement.  To achieve this it would be useful to compare the more managerially 
hands-on approach to measurement in progress at the Shires as a cross validation of approach to 
operational effectiveness for the Counties. 
In the longer term managing aging and societal change in the fire service represents a substantial 
challenge.  Operations management has a role in this by providing insight to the operational effects 
and monitoring changes at an operational level.  
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